The defense of the emotional

After delving into the ARCS chapter on pathetic proofs, I feel compelled to address the stance Crowley & Hawhee take on emotions in relation to rhetoric. One of the first points they take a strong position on is the perception that emotional responses are often illogical ones. “In our culture,” the authors state “if you’re emotional, you’re irrational. Reason is associated with mind, and connotes a calm, studied approach to issues. Emotions are associated with the body and are thought to be superficial and dangerous. People tend to think of emotions as belonging to individuals, like opinions. These prejudices are inaccurate and unfair.” (247)
Now, the chapter goes on to discuss the merits of an emotional appeal and how it can benefit rhetors in both constructing an argument and swaying an audience to agree with the stance of the rhetor. I dispute none of this, as emotional values can absolutely resonate with an audience just as well as ethical or logical proofs can. My issue with this work is the final sentence in the above quote.
For emphasis, I’ll re-post it “These prejudices are inaccurate and unfair.” (247) The first thing worth noting about this statement is the term prejudice. Using this word innately associates it with much more hate-fueled prejudices such as racism. This to me is a clear misconception of the alleged bias against emotional reactions in contemporary society.
I will happily agree with Crowley & Hawhee that we are a culture that celebrates logical reasoning and rational thinking above all else. But is that such a bad thing? Emotional responses, while they can easily be the correct ones, can just as easily lead to decisions based on clouded judgment. Would we want the President of the United States to fire a nuclear weapon at an enemy simply because they made him angry on a personal level? No, we would not, as it would almost certainly not be in the best interest of our nation and way of life. We put people in a position of power and ask them to be coldly rational not because it is what our society celebrates, but because such thought processes allow them to make the best decision possible based on hard, tangible evidence.
Personally, I see nothing wrong with that. Crowley & Hawhee seem to, however, as they even categorize pathetic proofs as “…the appeal to the emotions {that} seems strangest to contemporary rhetors…” (247). The way they word that sentence makes them come off as very sympathetic towards pathetic proofs and that is today’s world of contemporary rhetoric that is just a bit off. Perhaps it doesn’t seem strange so much as it is eschewed, as people don’t want those in power or authority who will make snap decisions based on emotion.
The last point I’d make on this subject is one that Dr. Kearney brought to our attention in class last week. Before she mentioned it, I had no idea the authors of ARCS were both women. The gender of the authors simply hadn’t occurred to me. However, after reading this section, I feel I would have had a much more difficult time remaining ignorant to that fact. They way Crowley & Hawhee defend emotional response right from the outset of the chapter shows that they are more sympathetic to emotions themselves, a trait more prominent in females than males. What that means I’m not entirely sure, but I certainly thought that slight bias might be worth noting as we examine the concept of pathetic proofs further as a group.